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Abstract. In the 1970s Danish debates on military history revealed a 
bifurcated understanding of military history between descriptive and 
applied military history. Descriptive military history was the study of 
military history done by academic historians, and applied military his-
tory was done by and taught to officers. The divide between descriptive 
and applied was rooted in the professionalization of history and officer 
education; it was constructed in order to accommodate the criticism 
that military history used in officer education did not live up to aca-
demic standards. By taking the Danish debates in the 1970s as a point of 
departure, this article introduces some fundamental challenges regard-
ing the use of military history in officer education. Inspired by the Ger-
man historian Reinhart Koselleck, the article argues that developments 
within academic history since the 1970s might have alleviated the con-
flict between academic military history and the military history used in 
officer education. Certainly, these new developments have opened up 
new approaches to military history. 
In 1974, a seminar took place in Copenhagen under the name “Where has 
military history gone? A discussion of military history” (Hvor blev mil­
itærhistorien af? En Diskussion om militærhistorisk forskning). The purpose 
of the seminar was to promote and strengthen military history by uniting 
officers and trained academics within the field of military history. However, 
1 The following article is based on preliminary studies of the author’s Ph.D. project analysing 
the use of history in Danish army officer education.
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it soon became clear that bridging the gap between these two parties was 
not a simple task. Besides the political difference of environment regarding 
officers and academics, a fundamental question of the character of military 
history emerged. In particular, the seminar participants disagreed on the 
purpose of military history as taught in officer education. 
In the 1970s, Danish research on military history was scarce, and had 
been so since the turn of the century. Research into Danish military his-
tory was limited to the extent that at times it was synonymous with the 
work undertaken by a small military history department of the Danish 
General Staff. Generally, military history in Denmark was written by offi-
cers. An aversion to military history had existed amongst academic his-
torians since the turn of the century. The history departments of Danish 
universities had no chairs, big or small, in military history.2 The Danish 
academic disinterest in military history was already clear in 1920 when 
General Lieutenant and honorary Doctor of History August Peder Tuxen 
gave a speech at the Nordic history meeting in Oslo. Tuxen expressed his 
regret that not more academically trained historians did research in the 
field of military history and furthermore defended the value of some of 
the publications on military history made by officers.3 These tendencies 
are not unique to Denmark. In many other Western countries, academic 
historians largely shunned military history.4 At the seminar in 1974, how-
ever, the Danish situation was perceived as particularly sombre, as it was 
expressed that the situation in Denmark was worse than in neighbouring 
Sweden. In contrast to Denmark, research groups working on research 
within the category of military history could be found at Swedish univer-
sities in Umeå, Göteborg and Lund.5 
2 Claus C. von Barnekow, Kaare E. Janson and Ole L. Frantzen, Hvor blev Militærhistorien af?: 
En diskussion om militærhistorisk forskning (København: HRFV, 1975), 2.
3 August Peder Tuxen, Dansk Krigshistorieskrivning i de sidste hundrede aar: Foredrag holdt 
ved det Nordiske Historikermøde i Kristiania 1920 (København: Vilhelm Tryde, 1921).
4 See Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” RUSI Journal 107, no. 625 
(1962): 4–10; John A. Lynn, “Breaching the Walls of Academe: The Purposes, Problems, and 
Prospects of Military History,” Academic Questions 21, no. 1 (2008): 18–36; Williamson Mur-
ray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military 
Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
5 Barnekow, Janson and Frantzen, Hvor blev Militærhistorien af?, 16.
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The differences between academic historians’ and officers’ approaches 
to military history became apparent at the seminar, unfolding further in 
biennial conferences on military history and in articles in historical jour-
nals. By taking the Danish debates as point of departure, this article will 
introduce some fundamental and well-known challenges regarding the 
use of military history in officer education.6 The debates on military his-
tory that took place in the 1970s Denmark revealed a bifurcated under-
standing of military history created to accommodate the criticism that 
military history used in officer education attracted. This article examines 
this distinction between applied and descriptive military history and how 
it was rooted in the professionalization of history and officer education. 
It ends by contemplating whether changes in academic history since the 
1970s have somewhat alleviated the conflict between academic history 
and military history as utilised in officer education. 
At the seminar on military history in 1974, the following reasons 
were given to explain the hardships of military history in Danish histori-
ography: political antimilitarism amongst historians, the professionaliza-
tion of both history and the military profession, and the non-academic 
use of military history among officers.7 These reasons all, in one way or 
another, relate to the utility of military history. One of the speakers at 
the meeting, Dr. Carl-Axel Gemzell of the University of Lund, explained 
the political antimilitarism among academic historians by pointing out 
that, leading up to and during the First World War, military history was 
used for propagandist purposes and to encourage armament. Danish his-
torians in the beginning of the 20th century predominantly belonged to 
the political Party Radikale Venstre (Radical Left) that carried very strong 
antimilitaristic sentiments. Therefore, academic historians did not want 
to participate in endeavours that could be seen as endorsing militarism.8 
As a result, war was increasingly seen as an abnormality in the course 
6 See Thomas Kühne and Benjamin Ziemann, eds., Was ist Militärgeschichte? Krieg in der 
Geschichte 6 (Paderborn: Schnönigh, 2000); Ursula von Gersdorff, Geschichte und Militär­
geschichte: Wege der Forschung (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 
1974); Murray, Sinnreich, The Past as Prologue.
7 Barnekow, Janson and Frantzen, Hvor blev Militærhistorien af?. 
8 Ibid., 12.
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of history and therefore not as something necessary to devote attention 
to. However, it was not only academic historians’ sceptical attitudes that 
threatened military use of military history. Gemzell points to a bureau-
cratization process that happened after the Second World War where the 
academics, who were becoming part of military staffs, did not include 
historians. Instead, they came primarily from the social sciences, more 
specifically economists, sociologists, political scientists and anthropolo-
gists. With their systematizing and empirically experimental approach 
they took over tasks that used to be that of the historian, and military his-
tory lost its monopoly on creating the empirical foundation for military 
theory.9 
Regarding the non-academic writing of military history as a reason 
for academic historians’ disinclinations towards military history, another 
speaker at the seminar, archivist and historian Hans Christian Bjerg, 
pointed to the lack of source criticism and sufficient context information 
leading academic historians to dismiss work written by officers. Para-
doxically, the few academic historians who did venture to write military 
history often received harsh criticism from officers, who argued that the 
academics lacked sufficient tactical and technical knowledge.10
The third reason regarding the professionalization of history as a 
cause for the hardships of military history concerns the way military his-
tory was taught in officer education. Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Nielsen was 
in 1974 a teacher of military history at the Army Academy (Hærens Offi­
cersskole) and teacher of strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College 
(Forsvarsakademiet). According to Nielsen, the role of military history 
was to bind together the three fundamental elements of officer education: 
operations in war and peace, political science and administration in war 
and peace, and basic understanding of the conditions on the battlefield. 
An important function was thereby to introduce the cadets to the Clause-
witzian concept of friction.11 When teaching cadets about friction and 
battlefield chaos, Nielsen did not distinguish between learning from offi-
9 Barnekow, Janson and Frantzen, Hvor blev Militaerhistorien af?, 13.
10 Ibid., 6.
11 Ibid., 28–32.
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cial records, personal accounts, or novels. He stated that studying other 
types of accounts will allow the officer to get closer to reality than field 
exercises.12 It is unclear whether it is necessary that the narratives that 
one learns from are meticulously based on facts about what actually hap-
pened, or is it is sufficient that the accounts are realistic. This ambiguity 
is another reason why military history in this context has been in conflict 
with academic history. 
Overall, Nielsen’s view of the utility of military history in officer edu-
cation aligns with that of the renowned military historian Sir Michael 
Howard: 
Like the statesman, the soldier has to steer between the dangers of 
repeating the errors of the past because he is ignorant that they have 
been made, and of remaining bound by theories deduced from past his-
tory although changes in conditions have rendered these theories obso-
lete.13 
Nielsen further cited military theorist General Giulio Douhet and his 
thought that “The preparation for war demands, then, exercise of the imag-
ination; we are compelled to make a mental excursion into the future.”14 
Military history in officer education had a clear utility. This utility con-
flicted with academic history, as I will show in the following  chapter. 
Military History and Magistra Vitae
With the professionalization of history, the notion that it is possible to 
learn from military history came under attack. In the above quote by Sir 
Michael Howard from his programmatic article The Use and Abuse of 
Military History, cited by Nielsen at the conference, a clear understanding 
that studying military history can prepare the officer for future battle is 
present – learning from the past can make the officer wiser for the future. 
12 “Militærhistorisk konference ’75 – en rapport: København, 15.–16. marts 1975” (Køben-
havn: Hærstabens Militærhistoriske Arbejder, 1975), 54–56.
13 Howard, “The Use and Abuse,” 7.
14 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington: Office of air force history, 1983), 145.
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The notion that it is possible to learn from history was coined in Latin 
antiquity in Cicero’s De Oratore as “Historia Magistra Vitae Est” – his-
tory as the teacher of life. Magistra vitae was a guiding principle of his-
tory for centuries. A classical understanding of magistra vitae in the 18th 
century was that history should be used as a collection of former actions 
and ways of life that could provide inspiration or dissuasion and guide 
people on how to best live their lives.15 Besides its instructive properties, 
magistra vitae also often had morally edifying qualities. It was considered 
that the role of the historian was to make clear what model behaviour the 
reader or listener should follow.16 History was seen as a field of experience 
from which one could harvest experience, skipping laborious and time-
consuming trial-and-error processes. According to the German historian 
Reinhart Koselleck: “Thus the writing of history was considered for about 
two thousand years or so to be a place of learning where one could become 
wiser without coming to any harm.”17 It is easy to see why this approach to 
history would appeal to the officer, who, as pointed out in Michael How-
ard’s quote, would likely not have any previous experience of war. 
If there are no wars in the present in which the professional soldier can 
learn his trade, he is almost compelled to study the wars of the past. For 
after all allowances have been made for historical differences, wars still 
resemble each other more than they resemble any other human activity.18
The concept of magistra vitae becomes maybe even more visible in a later 
quote by Howard: “Past wars provide the only database from which the 
military learn how to conduct their profession: how to do it and even 
more important, how not to do it.”19 
15 Bernard Eric Jensen, “Using a Past – Magistra Vitae Approaches to History,” – Negotiating 
Pasts in the Nordic Countires. Interdisciplinary Studies in History and Memory, ed. Anne Eriksen 
and Jón Vidar Sigurdsson (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2009), 214.
16 Anne Eriksen, “Livets Læremester,” Tidsskrift for Kulturforskning 9, no. 2 (2010): 39–54.
17 Cited in Jensen, “Using a Past,” 205.
18 Howard, “The Use and Abuse,” 7.
19 Michael Howard, “Military History and the History of War,” – The Past as Prologue. The 
Importance of History to the Military Profession, ed. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinn-
reich (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 13.
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However, with the professionalization of history beginning in the late 
17th century the magistra vitae approach to history was gradually rejected. 
This rejection can be summed up in the famous quote by Leopold von 
Ranke: “History has had assigned to it the office of judging the past and 
of instructing the present for the benefit of the future ages. To such high 
offices the present work does not presume: it seeks only to show what 
actually happened [wie es eigentlich gewesen].”20 History should no lon-
ger be action indicating, instruct the present and guide the future, but 
was with its professionalization viewed as a strictly ideographic science, 
meaning that history became a science about unique events that once 
were, conducted by professional historians. History distinguished itself 
from other sciences by its special subject matter – the past – that can 
never be approached directly, but only indirectly through remnants of the 
past in the shape of various source material.
20 Leopold von Ranke, “Preface: Histories of the Romance and Germanic Peoples,” – The Vari­
eties of History. From Voltaire to the Present, ed. Fritz Stern (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 
57.
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The rejection of the magistra vitae approach to history made it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to use military history in officer education in the 
way described by K.V. Nielsen, while at the same time adhering to the aca-
demic standards of history. The extent of the conflict between academic 
history and the notion that military history has utility, I argue, depends 
on how this utility is understood. Inspired by historian and Brigadier 
General Michael H. Clemmesen, a way to understanding the utility of 
military history is to distinguish between learning form military history 
in the way of guidance, and in the way of insight.21 By military history 
offering guidance, is meant that it is possible to derive action-indicating 
principles of war from the past. This is also what Michael Howard has 
called “school solutions” in his introductory article of the anthology The 
Past as Prologue22 and what Clemmesen calls “Enlightenment tradition 
of identifying theoretical patterns and seeking positive guidance from a 
systematic analysis of the measurable extracts of a significant number of 
cases.”23 Military history then becomes generalizing and predictive, and 
therefore clashes with the standards of academic history. 
However, if one believes military history only offers general insight 
from the study of past wars, the conflict with academic history becomes 
less clear. Defining what is meant by military history yielding “general 
insight” is more difficult than defining what is meant by “guidance”. 
According to Clemmesen, military history offering general insight entails 
that “The maximum they [past military cases] can do is to highlight gen-
eral human and organizational as well as specific cultural frailties that 
are likely to undermine the effectiveness of preparations for and action 
in war.”24 However, this does not mean that the past should not be stud-
ied or that this kind of insight can be gained once and for all. Rather, 
gaining insight from military history generates knowledge about human 
character and life, similar in a sense to wisdom. But, as military historian 
John R. Lynn points out, “To be sure, there is no guarantee that histori-
21 Michael H. Clemmesen, “Combat Case History in Advanced Officer Development: Extract-
ing what is difficult to apply,” Baltic Security and Defence Review 17, no. 2 (2014): 38.
22 Howard, “Military History and the History of War,” 13.
23 Clemmesen, “Combat Case History,” 38.
24 Ibid., 57.
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cal knowledge translates into current wisdom, but knowledge is a better 
hedge against disaster than is ignorance”.25 With this kind of pragmatic 
attitude towards military history the opposition to academic history 
diminishes as the form of knowledge obtained is intangible. The bound-
aries between insight and guidance are, however, not clear. 
When reading different works that touch on the subject of learn-
ing from military history, it can be very difficult to discern whether the 
authors believe it possible to use military history as guiding principles of 
war, or if they believe it possible only to gain insight of the study of past 
wars, and exactly how the learning processes take place. Some authors, 
explicitly committed to Michael Howard’s study of history, contradicto-
rily believe in the possibility to deduct positive principles from war.26 A 
central question to military history is therefore to what extent it is possi-
ble to generalize from past experiences in preparing for the future. Where 
does guidance stop and where does insight start – are they dichotomic 
categories or should the two concepts be viewed as poles on a contin-
uum? And does the understanding of learning clash with academic stan-
dards of history? I will further elaborate on these questions by returning 
to the aforementioned debates about the character of military history 
in Denmark. 
Military history – science or art?
At the seminar in 1974, archivist and historian Hans Christian Bjerg 
expressed his views about how the different goals of the officers on the 
one hand and the academically trained historians on the other might 
explain why military history had regressed. He pointed to the lack of the 
distinction between what he called descriptive (beskrivende) and applied 
(anvendt) military history as a reason for this regression: 
25 John A. Lynn, “Breaching the Walls of Academe: The purposes, problems, and prospects of 
military history,” Academic Questions 21 (2008), 22.
26 Michael H. Clemmesen and Anna Sofie Schøning, “På Vej Til Antologien Og Dette Binds 
Eksempler,” – Om Læring Og Indsigt Fra Krig. Isted 1850 Til Musa Qala 2006, ed. Michael H. 
Clemmesen (Odense: Syddansk Universtitetsforlag, 2018), 11–23.
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I have often speculated if this dilemma has developed because the two 
categories have very different objectives as to their research and writ-
ing – and that it all boils down to the fact that the distinction between 
what I call descriptive and applied military history has not been made.
It is evident and completely legitimate that officers need to analyse 
past battles and technologically special military situations with the pur-
pose of gaining experience for future situations. In this case the officer 
has a clear-cut purpose with his military historical research – or rather, 
military technical research applied to historical data; it would however 
be wrong to merely translate this circumstance to being pragmatic his-
tory writing. 
The academic historian will contrarily rarely have this pragmatic goal 
for his studies. Maybe this is the reason for the restraining dilemma.27
Bjerg first introduced the distinction between applied and descriptive 
military history when reviewing a book on military history, Militærhisto­
rie, written by Lieutenant Colonel Helge Klint, for the history journal His­
torisk Tidsskift in 1971.28 The book gave a general introduction to military 
history, and was published in 1970 based on an orientation about military 
history given as an introductory course for first year history students at 
University of Copenhagen in the winter of 1967/68.29 Lieutenant Colonel 
Klint was one of very few Danish officers who had taught at a university 
history department at the time. Klint himself used the term “applied his-
tory” in his book,30 but was criticized by Bjerg for not focusing more on 
the distinction between applied and descriptive military history. Accord-
ing to Bjerg, applied military history is military technical analysis includ-
ing military theoretical studies, where the main purpose is to provide the 
officer with knowledge he can use for future situations. What he means by 
27 Bjerg in Claus C. von. Barnekow, Ole Louis Frantzen and Kaare E. Janson, Hvor blev mil­
itærhistorien af?: en diskussion om militærhistorisk forskning (Kbh.: [s.n.], 1975), 6f. All Danish 
translations are by the author.
28 Hans Christian Bjerg, “Helge Klint: Militærhistorie,” Historisk Tidsskrift 12, no. 5 (1971): 
185–186.
29 Helge Klint, Militærhistorie (København: Dansk historisk Fællesforenings håndbøger, 
1970), 109, 5.
30 Klint, Militærhistorie, 11.
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descriptive military history is vaguer and is not described further than it 
is academic historians’ historical analysis of military affairs.31 
Bjerg is himself not quite clear in his definition of the two concepts, 
as he predominantly addresses instances where the two have been mixed. 
As long as the distinction was made between these two kinds of military 
history, Bjerg did not view applied history as problematic – it was simply 
a form that did not have to live up to the standards of academic history.32 
Conversely, when this distinction was made, historical research was not 
tainted by a non-academic utilitarian purpose and met academic stan-
dards. However, not all historians of the time agreed with this distinction. 
Contrary to Bjerg, assistant professor and future associate professor at the 
University of Southern Denmark Knud J.V. Jespersen saw this distinction 
as highly problematic. This distinction became the crux of a debate on 
the use of military history that followed the first conference of military 
history in 1974.
According to Knud J. V. Jespersen, the distinction between applied 
and descriptive military history could be traced back to an article about 
military history written by B.P Berthelsens in the Danish Encyclopedia 
Salmonsens store illustrerede Konversationsleksikon in 1900. In this article, 
it was expressed that military history could either be a purely historical 
study of the sources – with the purpose of getting as close as possible to 
the transpired events – or serve educational purposes to officers.33 Here 
Jespersen reads Berthelsens’ definition of two forms of history as com-
parable to Nielsen’s concepts of descriptive and applied military history. 
According to Jespersen, this was a widespread understanding of military 
history around the turn of the century when disciplines were divided into 
applied and descriptive, inspired by the natural sciences. The task of the 
historian was to deliver objective and truthful descriptions from which 
the officer could derive what was generally applicable and useful for the 
future.34 
31 Bjerg, “Helge Klint: Militærhistorie,” 185f.
32 Barnekow, Janson and Frantzen, Hvor blev Militærhistorien af?, 7.
33 Knud J. V. Jespersen, “Krigshistorioens Lære Og Krigens Historikere,” Historie/Jyske Sam­
linger Ny række, no. 12 (1977): 27.
34 Jespersen, “Krigshistorioens,” 28.
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This distinction can be traced even further back. In the very first 
educational plans of the Danish Royal Military Academy from 1830 
one can also find this distinction in the form of two different military 
 history subjects: Denmark’s Military History (Danmarks Krigs historie) 
and Campaign History (Feldttogshistorie). Denmark’s Military History 
was, judging from the textbook made for the subject and published in 
1834, a classical historical subject with a focus on providing the officer 
with knowledge of Danish military feats.35 In Campaign History, stu-
dents analysed one or two campaigns and compared the conclusions 
of this analysis with the dominant military theory. This course was a 
development of the course in what was called applied tactics (anvendt 
taktik) and required knowledge of troop movement and the guiding 
principles of warfare.36 Even though the concepts of “descriptive” and 
“applied” history were not used here, the difference in the two subjects 
can be said to follow the same logic as the distinction between descrip-
tive and applied history: Denmark’s military history being a tradi-
tional historical past-orientated subject and  campaign history being 
a subject using the past only if it is relevant for the present and the 
future. 
According to Jespersen, the applied version of military history should 
be avoided altogether. In an article about the battle of Lutter am Baren-
berg, Jespersen stated that the lessons being drawn from this battle were 
a poorly made construction. The lessons drawn, he argued, could not be 
separated from the historical research since they were selected depending 
heavily on exactly that research. Hence it was a futile idea to divide mili-
tary history in a descriptive part, which produces objective knowledge 
of the past, and an applied part, where lessons for the future were drawn 
based on the descriptive military history.37 This attitude to military his-
tory is supported by Norwegian historian and PhD in Philosophy Lieu-
tenant Colonel Harald Høiback who agrees that the lessons of history are 
35 Anna Sofie Schøning, “Mellem Historie- Og Krigsvidenskab: Krigshistorie i Udbygningen 
Af Hærens Stabsofficersuddannelse 1830–1920,” Fra Krig Og Fred (2017), 37.
36 Schøning, “Mellem Historie- Og Krigsvidenskab,” 41f. 
37 Jespersen, “Krigshistorioens,” 30.
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the lessons of the historian; when one looks for answers in history, one 
usually finds what one came after.38 
Therefore, an important question is whether it is at all possible to draw 
objective knowledge from the past. To Bjerg, who believed that it was in 
fact possible to have objective historical knowledge, it became essential 
that the applied and descriptive versions of military history were sepa-
rated. Jespersen fully dismissed the thought of any lessons learning from 
military history as he explained it would always be the lessons of the mili-
tary historian as opposed to lessons from history itself.39 In another arti-
cle from 1977, Jespersen delves more into what the distinction between 
descriptive and applied means for military history.40 He explained it as a 
result of military history belonging to the military sciences and therefore 
was considered an exact science rather than a critical one (as he calls his 
own understanding of history). In the 1977 article, Jespersen criticized 
Lieutenant Colonel Nielsen’s understanding of military history as it was 
expressed at the conference in 1974.41 This led Nielsen to defend his view 
of military history. Nielsen explained that, due to the limited time to dis-
cuss the relevant questions at the army school, it was not possible for 
the student to conduct any historical research. This does, according to 
Nielsen, not mean that the way military history is studied at the Danish 
Army Academy is not serious, or that it did not strive to live up to aca-
demic standards.42 However, Nielsen did not try to hide that he believed 
that officers can be better prepared for the future by studying military 
history and that military history can help find what is constant in the 
conduct of war. On the utility of military history, he writes:
This is, as I view it, not an antiquated conception about ‘the lessons 
of military history’, it is rather a completely viable and highly relevant 
38 Harald Høiback, “Kan vi Lære Av Historien? En Studie i Militær Kompetansefilosofi,” Fors­
varsstudier 1 (2003): 70f.
39 Jespersen, “Krigshistorioens,” 46.
40 Knud J. V. Jespersen, “En Militærhistorisk Renaissance?,” Historisk Tidsskrift 4, no. 13 
(1977): 135–142.
41 Jespersen, “En Militærhistorisk Renaissance?,” 140.
42 Kai Vilhelm Nielsen, “En Kommentar Til ‘Krigshistoriens Lære’ og Krigens Historikere,” 
Historie/Jyske Samlinger Ny række 1, no. 1–2 (1979): 71–74.
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application of illustrative material from history applied in an interdisci-
plinary education of people in a profession where this kind of illustra-
tion can help develop ‘versatility, adaptability and flexibility’.43 
For Nielsen, the study of military history offers guidance as opposed to 
insight, as previously described. This in turn makes the difference between 
military history as utilized in officer education seem stronger and makes 
Jespersen question the epistemology of this kind of military history:
The question is in other words if military history should be considered 
nomothetic (generalizing science) or ideographic (individualizing). I 
am naturally of the opinion that it as an integrated part of academic 
history is the last. On this vital aspect I am missing a clarification from 
KVN [Kai Vilhelm Nielsen].44
To Jespersen it was unclear what kind of science military history was for 
Nielsen. The distinction between nomothetic and ideographic that Jes-
persen used was first coined by German neo-Kantian philosopher Wil-
helm Windelband at the turn of the 19th century. A nomothetic science is 
one that deals with general laws, what is universal, whereas ideographic 
sciences are concerned with what once was both understood as some-
thing particular and as something that was in the past. However, this only 
describes the treatment of knowledge, not the actual content. The distinc-
tion has also been widely criticized and has caused confusion.45 
The distinction was made to differentiate between the methods of 
natural sciences on one hand and the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) 
on the other, since disciplines like psychology were using methods for-
merly reserved for natural science while being a science about inner 
human life. Windelband did not argue that all human sciences were nec-
essarily historical. Therefore, it is useless to operate with this distinction 
as a tool to separate natural sciences on the one hand and social sciences 
43 Nielsen, “En Kommentar,” 74.
44 Knud J. V. Jespersen, “Svar Til En Lærer i Krigshistorie,” Historie/Jyske Samlinger 13 (1979): 
76.
45 Frederick Charles Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 382.
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and humanities on the other. However, the question of whether one can 
derive laws from military history, or one should refrain from making 
generalizations based on past battles remains a highly interesting ques-
tion to discuss regarding the use of military history in officer education. 
This question is also related to the distinction between military history 
 offering guidance or insight.
 As I see it, Jespersen could, in the above quote, just as well have asked 
Nielsen for clarity on whether he saw military history as offering guidance 
or insight. Military history offering guidance, as described previously, 
entails the idea that warfare is governed by general laws. However, no such 
laws can be deducted from military history if it only offers insight. Danish 
military history in officer education seems to contain a sort of dualism. 
Different concept pairs have been used to describe this phenomenon. 
Besides descriptive/applied, ideographic/nomothetic, guidance/insight, 
the distinction consumer/producer was also used in the Danish debate. 
Nielsen introduced this distinction at the seminar in 1974 to make clear 
that he as a military history teacher of the Danish Army College was a 
consumer of military history rather than a producer. He describes that it 
is a pity that it is not possible for him as a consumer to get relevant mili-
tary history that is Danish made.46 Although these descriptions are dif-
ferent, they are as I view them all attempts to overcome the separation of 
academic history and military history as taught in officer education that 
happened with the professionalization of history. Looking further back 
to the beginning of the 20th century, teacher of military history Rolf Kall 
used the terms narrative and learning military history to make similar 
distinctions of military history.47 This illustrates clearly that it has been a 
problem for military history. Although I think a lot can be learned about 
military history from studying these concept pairs, there might be reason 
to believe that the conflict between academic history and military history 
taught in officer education – so vivid in the 1970s Denmark with roots 
dating back to the professionalization of history – has diminished today. 
46 Barnekow, Frantzen and Janson, Hvor blev militærhistorien af?, 28.
47 Schøning, “Mellem Historie- Og Krigsvidenskab,” 77f.
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Military history today
It is my impression that since the 1970s, Danish military history as taught 
in officer education has in many ways followed developments in academic 
history. The gap between the two types of military history has shrunk in 
a way that it is questionable whether one even can speak of two distinct 
types. In a Danish context, the utility that military history offers is pre-
dominantly viewed in terms of insight rather than guidance. Addition-
ally, within Danish academic history it has become more acceptable that 
history has a use. 
In the last thirty years in Denmark, a new field of history that focuses 
on memory and the uses of pasts has been established. This is inspired 
by an international focus on historical consciousness and cultural mem-
ory, building on theories by among other Maurice Halbwachs, which 
received renewed interest in the 1970s and 1980s.48 This theoretical field’s 
approach to history opens up the definition of what history is. History 
is not only the research that takes place in history departments, in uni-
versities, and at museums. The scope broadens to include how people 
outside of academia use history. Following this approach, it is equally if 
not more interesting how ordinary people view history and how history 
is used in public institutions.49 In Denmark, the reason for placing the 
focus on what goes on outside academic circles was explained by two of 
the Danish pioneers of this approach to history: history professors Claus 
Bryld and Bernard Eric Jensen. The two had different ways of explaining 
the need for academic Danish history writing to be less revolving around 
itself. Claus Bryld put forth the argument that since history is produced 
and communicated by so many people other than historians, the focus 
should broaden to also include how history is used in various institu-
tions and political debates. Bernard Eric Jensen had a different viewpoint, 
given his history didactic background. According to Jensen, conscious-
ness of history is a human prerequisite. It is not possible to understand 
48 Anette Elisabeth Warring, “Erindring og Historiebrug. Introduktion til et forskningsfelt,” 
Temp. Tidskrift for historie 1, no. 2 (2011): 6, 13.
49 Warring, “Erindring og Historiebrug,” 10.
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human behaviour without understanding how the human thinks and 
uses history.50
According to Norwegian history theorist Helge Jordheim, looking at 
how history is understood outside academia makes evident that the mag­
istra vitae approach to history is thriving. To most people, the notion that 
it is possible to learn from history is obvious.51 Without conscious effort, 
most people go about their lives with the understanding that it is possible 
to learn from history. Jensen proves that even within Danish academic 
history it was difficult to completely abandon the thought. A complete 
rejection of the notion of magistra vitae had not happened in the begin-
ning of 1911 when Danish prolific historian Kristian Erslev published his 
book on historical method:
Thus, Erslev was attributing a bifurcated professional identity to the 
historical profession. When historians were engaged in writing history, 
they could continue to employ a magistra vitæ approach in order to 
identify usable pasts. However, when they set out to study the past in a 
scientific manner, they only had to concern themselves with what actu-
ally had occurred and abstain from any attempt at clarifying the ways in 
which knowledge of the past events could prove useful in a contempo-
rary setting.52 
Erslev distinguished between history writing and history research in 
order to include magistra vitae as a viable understanding of history. 
Erslevs successors, however, delivered a more definitive rejection of mag­
istra vitae.53 This distinction can somehow be said to be similar to the one 
made regarding military history.
Underlining the academic acceptance of history’s use in the new his-
torical tradition was an understanding of time inspired by the German 
history theorist Reinhart Koselleck, which was different from the past 
fixated understanding of history. With this theoretical approach, history 
50 Ibid., 8.
51 Helge Jordheim, “Historia Magistra Vitae i Det 21. Århundrede. Debatten Om Falstad,” Arr 
­ Idéhistorisk Tidsskrift 3, no. 4 (2009): 26.
52 Jensen, “Using a Past,” 226.
53 Ibid., 227.
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is not a science only about the past, but one that equally concerns the 
present and the future.
The way Koselleck describes the relation between the past, present and 
future as interchangeable, not separated, entities generates an understand-
ing of history where it is possible to learn from the past and overcome the 
question of history being ideographic or nomothetic. Koselleck offers an 
alternative way to perceive the past. The past is relevant to the present not 
because history is repeating itself, nor does history have to be a nomothetic 
endeavour and only a tool to deduce overall and generic principles guid-
ing the world but simply because the concepts “experience” and “expecta-
tion”, according to Koselleck, “are human conditions that it is not possible 
to understand history without”.54 Using the concepts “space of experience 
and “horizon of expectation”, Koselleck explains the relation of past, pres-
ent and future as follows: “Experience is present past, whose events have 
been incorporated and can be remembered.”55 The past is therefore always 
present as experience. The military history studied by officers will in this 
sense be part of the space of experience for those officers. It does not mat-
ter if the studied past is first-hand experiences or experiences of others in 
the form of history. What matters is that it is remembered. As experiences 
are always present, so are expectations. Expectations are “(…) the future 
made present; it directs itself to the not-yet, to the nonexperienced, to that 
which is to be revealed.”56 This understanding of time signifies that learn-
ing from history takes place continuously – experience is what we bring 
with us to the present. Experiences also affects expectations of how the 
future might unfold, as expectations conversely also effect what experi-
ences are deemed relevant. These are processes that, whether we are aware 
of them or not, are always part of human life. 
The above theoretical approach lays the groundwork for asking 
exploratory questions rather than correcting the way military history is 
used in officer education. To the historian of this theoretical observation, 
it becomes interesting why military history is used as it is used. What 
54 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), 257.
55 Ibid., 259.
56 Ibid.
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pasts are deemed relevant? Why is it possible to learn from some pasts, 
while not from others? And how are these pasts related to present mili-
tary strategic situations and future military conduct?
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